The No Confidence Amendment

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Introduction

This document is an exploration of a potential amendment to the United States Constitution called the No Confidence Amendment. It has no legal force yet, and it will not take effect unless and until 38 states agree to it.

The No Confidence Amendment is a work in progress, and this second draft is the result of public feedback on the first. No Confidence cannot succeed unless and until it satisfies the needs and values of every American; if you don't see yourself represented in its text, please reach out with your critiques.

The current form of No Confidence is the product of American laypeople, informed by the reactions of the lay American public. Before we can adopt its text into our Constitution, it must not only meet the needs of the American people, it must be as unambiguous and legally defensible as it is possible to be in 2026.

No Confidence needs lawyers, judges, and Constitutional scholars willing to publicly review its text and provide feedback and certainty that this is a viable path forward for America.

Until No Confidence has passed that level of review, the amendment text itself (indented and in serif font) should be considered only an illustrative example; it is certainly not ready to introduce as legislation.

History

The United States Constitution has not been amended in any meaningful way since 1971. This, in and of itself, is evidence of a dysfunction that has been growing steadily over the past several decades. The Founders themselves understood that any legal document must change over time if it is to continue to serve the needs of the people. James Wilson, Pennsylvania delegate to the Constitutional Convention, described what he called the "vital principle" of American constitutionalism thus: "that the supreme or sovereign power of the society resides in the citizens at large; and that, therefore, they always retain the right of abolishing, altering, or amending their constitution, at whatever time, and in whatever manner, they shall deem it expedient."

Amendment is our Constitution's alternative to armed insurrection. As of 2026, it has been 55 years since we last proposed and ratified an amendment. The US Constitution has only gone this long without ratification once in its history: after the 12th Amendment was ratified in 1804, 57 years passed before the Civil War began in 1861.

Context

The No Confidence Amendment has not yet been ratified or even introduced. It may never be ratified. It may be ratified in weeks; it may be ratified in years.

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There is no way to know for certain what the political environment will be if and when we ratify No Confidence. Donald Trump may be President, as he is now; he may not be. The Republican Party may control Congress; the Democratic party may; the houses may be split.

No Confidence is not a punishment for the people currently in power. It is a recognition that the American government has become so hopelessly mired in its own process that those in power are no longer *capable* of steering our country where the American people need it to go.

As such, we can be certain of two things if No Confidence is ever ratified or re-activated:

1. The American people on the whole have lost faith in the Federal Government.
2. The legislatures of at least ¾ of the states (38, in 2026) are on board with the plan.

Glossary

- **Sortition** (from Wikipedia): the selection of public officials or jurors at random, i.e., by lottery, in order to obtain a representative sample. Also sometimes called “lottocracy.”
- **Approval Voting** (from Center for Election Science): a method in which voters are allowed to select any number of candidates they approve of, rather than just one.
- **Remedy Election** (defined within): any electoral process legislated by a state that conforms to a number of criteria, including using Approval Voting on ballots and selecting candidates by sortition.
- **Suspended** (defined within): a government action that has been placed in a Constitutionally-defined quarantine, and which is at risk of being annulled by the Interim Government.
- **Interim Government** (defined within): a democratically-elected Congress and President in which every member of Congress, as well as the President and Vice President, have been elected by Remedy Election.
- **Civil Deputy** (defined within): a state employee whose wages are paid by the Federal Government. Civil Deputies act as both a surge workforce for the state government and an economic stimulus to recuperate the costs of the Remedy Elections used to elect the Interim Government.

What is ***No Confidence****?*

The **No Confidence Amendment** is an amendment to the United States Constitution which, like the 25th Amendment, provides additional checks and balances to the United States Government. In the case of the 25th Amendment, the Vice President and the Cabinet are given the authority to remove an acting President from office. In the case of No Confidence, the States are given the authority to remove Congress, SCOTUS, and the President and VP from office, along with their appointees, all at once.

The wide-ranging effects of No Confidence serve as both a deterrent and a safeguard. A deterrent, so that the States won't be willing to use it unless they are absolutely certain it is what

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their citizens want; a safeguard, to ensure that whenever we *do* end up needing to invoke No Confidence, we clean out as much corruption as possible without endangering the citizenry.

This explainer walks through the text of the Amendment section by section, describing what each piece of text means, and why it is written the way it is.

Section 1: Activation and immediate effects

When does it activate?

One of the primary ways that the Constitution restricts the usage of its more drastic powers is by requiring more consensus to activate them. A simple majority is all that is required to pass a national law, elect a President, or admit a new State into the Union. A three-fifths supermajority will end a filibuster in the Senate; a two-thirds supermajority will override a Presidential veto or propose a new Constitutional Amendment. Before such an amendment will take effect, however, it must be ratified by **three-quarters** of all the states (38 of them, at this point).

Since No Confidence allows America to circumvent our usual Constitutional processes, it requires that any use of it in the future (hopefully the far, far future) carry the same burden of consensus as it does to ratify it in the first place: three-quarters of however many States exist at that time.

> **Section 1.** Upon ratification of this article, or upon affirmation by the legislatures of three quarters of the several States, the current federal government of the United States shall be considered to have defaulted on its oath of office and shall be removed.

When you start a new job at a private employer, most will have you sign an employment contract. When you take office in the Federal Government, you swear an oath that you will uphold the Constitution while in office (in addition, sometimes, to the contract). Until now, this oath has had very little legal force. There is no legal text to define whether or not such an oath has been upheld; the only authority that could define such a rule is the Constitution itself. Here we give it one such definition: that oath has been broken when 75% of the states agree it has.

As we have discovered time and again over the past 250 years, this 75% threshold simply cannot be met on any politically divisive issue. The only way that many states ever agree on anything is when the American people have made it extremely clear that it is their will.

If we ratify No Confidence, we provide a due process that allows a “jury” comprising the whole of America to find the Federal Government guilty of, at the very least, failing in its duty.

Specifying that No Confidence acts by finding them “in default of their oath” serves another purpose as well: it prevents any confusion about timing. If No Confidence acted *by* removing the members of the Federal government, then what would happen if they refused to leave? Do the other effects of No Confidence happen once the decision is made, or once they’re finally out?

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This wording answers those questions: No Confidence takes effect instantly, as soon as the decision is made.

Who does it affect?

> This shall include the sitting President and Vice President of the United States, any person who might assume the powers and duties of the office of President, each sitting Justice of the Supreme Court, each member of Congress, and any person appointed to any office during the current Presidential Term by any person this Article considers in default of their oath of office.

Section 1 continues on to list the offices that are affected by No Confidence. This will, inevitably, remove some officials that have been faithful in their roles, but we cannot afford to carve exceptions out for them; when we invoke No Confidence, we are declaring that there *is* no one we trust to make that determination. In addition, we must remember that if this Constitution survives for another 250 years, we have no idea what type of corruption our descendants might face. We must ensure that No Confidence will be ready to help them in their time of need, just as the Founders ensured that we would have the ability to create No Confidence today.

Thus, the list of affected offices includes not only every justice on the Supreme Court, the entirety of both houses of Congress, and the President, Vice President, and Cabinet, but also *anyone* appointed to an office by any member of the government being dismissed, whether that office is government, military, or other, since the beginning of the current Presidential term.

What does it do?

> These persons shall immediately be dismissed and are prohibited from performing any governmental functions starting at the time they are considered in default.

Every affected official is removed from office. The removal is immediate, and they are not permitted to take any additional actions before leaving.

> All military authority, privilege, clearance, and trust vested in these persons is suspended, pending review by a new Congress. Officers in the Armed Forces retain their rank and commission but are suspended from duty and command.

They also have any security clearances temporarily revoked, and they are removed from the military chain of command. The United States military is, by far, the strongest military in the world. It is also unswervingly loyal to the Constitution and to its own chain of command; by stripping the President of his authority as the Commander in Chief of our armed forces, they will immediately revert to defense of our country against its external foes. Any military, ours included, must be prepared for the abrupt removal of its commanding officers, and our military changes out its Commander in Chief every four years.

If you're worried that our enemies might take advantage of some perceived weakness when we do this, I'll first remind you: our military is the *strongest in the world.* Another country might need

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to worry if they attempted something like what we're doing with No Confidence. The United States, emphatically, does not.

The rest of Section 1 provides a safety valve to release the immediate societal pressure that led to the No Confidence ratification or activation:

> All official actions taken by members of the Federal Government who have resigned or been dismissed, for any reason including default of oath, since the beginning of the current Presidential Term are suspended and placed under review. This shall include all Executive Orders issued, all Pardons and Reprieves granted, all legal decisions or opinions issued by justices or judges, all acts of Congress, all rules and regulations issued by Federal organizations, and all orders to the United States Armed Forces.

No Confidence cannot be activated unless 75% of American states believe that going through a long and difficult period of upheaval is better for the country than allowing the current Federal Government to remain in office. That means that, if No Confidence has been activated, the government has done something that the American people *really* didn't like. If these decisions remain in place while we wait for a new government to be elected, it may take long enough for tensions to boil over.

The government will have also done things the people did like, though, even if only from statistical certainty; they may even have done things critical to American safety. We do not, therefore, immediately void these actions *en masse;* we simply place them in quarantine, until we have someone the whole country trusts to review them.

Section 2: Dismissed Officials

> **Section 2.** Dismissal from office for default of oath shall not be considered an adverse finding for any person so dismissed. Neither Congress nor any State shall make any law penalizing persons so dismissed. These persons remain entitled to any wage or salary in effect at the time of dismissal and shall continue to receive payment as though not dismissed in this way, until the end of the Term of the Interim Congress, but in no event later than they would have received payment if not so dismissed.

Regardless of the governance of our nation, the people who will be dismissed by No Confidence will be losing their jobs. This includes not only the politicians themselves, but also any of their staffers. This section serves as a "severance package": anyone dismissed by No Confidence will continue getting paid for as long as the Interim Congress is in office (or less time, if their contract was already scheduled to end).

No Confidence is a finding that our *government* has failed. Attempting to discern who within that government was responsible for that failure is an unnecessary expense for the American people and would likely only cause more unrest and divisiveness; thus, we must treat every dismissed

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person with the presumption of innocence. If no person can be considered individually at fault, then terminating their salary without warning can only be considered an unreasonable punishment.

Section 3: Suspended Actions

> **Section 3.** An action of the Federal Government that has been suspended shall be treated as though it had never occurred, except in cases where such treatment is likely to cause immediate and irreversible danger to the United States or any of its citizens.

The basic rule for actions under quarantine: if you can safely pretend it didn't happen, it didn't happen. It's worth remembering that the Constitution is not code run by a computer: it is a set of rules interpreted by humans. "Pretend it didn't happen" is something we humans are great at.

That doesn't work for everything, though.

> A suspended Pardon or Reprieve is treated as though it had never been granted; however, the United States is prohibited from prosecuting or punishing such an offence for as long as the Pardon or Reprieve remains suspended.

Pardons normally can't be undone, and for very good reason: it is inherently unfair to a person to be told they are free and clear, and to then have that walked back. That's why the Fifth Amendment has protections against double jeopardy.

We can't unconditionally revoke all pardons, even if the following President could simply re-issue the same pardon. That delay could cause "immediate and irreversible" danger to the recipient.

We also can't set the precedent of allowing the US government to cancel active pardons. So, we have this compromise: the suspended pardon is wiped from the books (and so the person again becomes either guilty or prosecutable, depending on if they were pardoned before or after trial). However, as long as the *suspension* remains on the books, they won't go back to trial or prison.

> A suspended judgment that a law is Unconstitutional allows that law to be reinstated by its legislature; a suspended judgment that a law is Constitutional does not rescind that law. A suspended reversal of a lower Court's ruling allows that lower Court to reassert that ruling; a suspended affirmation does not dismiss the lower Court's ruling.

Judicial decisions (either from the Supreme Court or from Circuit Court judges that were dismissed) are treated in a permissive manner while suspended: anything that got forbidden can be allowed again, but anything that was allowed doesn't automatically get forbidden.

> Suspended laws and regulations shall not be enforced by the Federal Government, nor shall penalties be assessed for violating them. Suspended revocations of

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> benefits or licenses allow the recipient to re-apply; suspended grants do not revoke the grant. Until such time as a new budget is approved, the most recent approved budget shall be treated as though it is in force, regardless of suspension or expiration.

Acts of Congress and pseudo-legislative regulations set by Federal entities are treated similarly to judicial actions, in a permissive way. This allows law-abiding citizens and organizations to continue their work unbothered, while any person or corporation that bribed or cheated their way into being rewarded by the government is put on notice.

The budget isn't something that can simply be rolled back. We keep the latest budget, even if it would have expired already, to keep the government funded after No Confidence.

> Any suspended order to the United States Armed Forces shall be adjudicated by the highest-ranking officer subject to that order who was not dismissed. That officer shall decide whether that suspended order is still in effect, taking into account the safety of the United States, its citizens, and its Armed Forces, and shall transmit that decision to all other officers affected by the same order.

The only people who can judge the safety of the military are the military themselves. This provides our soldiers legal cover to make the decisions that will keep them and us safe, while maintaining a clear definition of who is responsible for making those decisions.

Section 4: Continuity of Government

> **Section 4.** The Federal Government shall continue performing its duties to the greatest extent possible after being found in default, following existing regulations and procedures. Any non-military Federal agency or organization that, in order to avoid immediate and irreversible danger to the United States or its citizens, requires the approval of an office whose holder has been dismissed may instead substitute either a public vote of three-quarters of the highest-ranking members of that agency or organization provided at least four such members have not been suspended, or a public vote of three-quarters of all the members of that agency or organization; such a substituted approval shall be considered a suspended action per Section 3 of this article, subject to review by the Interim Government. Voting in support of such a substituted approval is considered an official act of the government and shall be defended as such, unless the Interim Government overrides that approval.

At the conclusion of the effects of Section 1, the government of the United States will be in a sort of "Safe Mode." It will operate similarly to how it does when Congress is in shutdown, which we've experienced so many times over the recent years: all the day-to-day operations will continue, but no one will be making any *new* decisions. One critical difference is that all

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government workers, both “essential” and “non-essential”, will continue both performing their jobs *and* receiving their paychecks.

For the same reason we must not simply void every action of the prior government, we must ensure that every function of the government is still accessible, even in the short span of time before we can elect our Interim Government. For non-military agencies, we allow them to write their own approvals, with four extremely important caveats:

1. That decision must “avoid immediate and irreversible danger to the United States or its citizens.” This is, not coincidentally, the same threshold as ignoring suspension of an action.
2. This self-approval is considered a “suspended action” itself, and so it only has force as long as ignoring it would cause that danger. (In other words, as long as it’s still needed.)
3. At least 75% of either (a) the top-ranking employees still remaining, so long as there are at least four of those, or (b) *all* employees still remaining, must publicly vote in favor of the approval.
4. If the Interim Government overturns that approval, then everyone who voted in favor of it loses their immunity for doing so.

If any organization attempts to cash that blank check without a *very* good reason, it is very likely to harm the people who did so. In practice, the 75% threshold is probably even lower than it needs to be; chances are good that if any federal agency *does* need to use this rule, it will be so obvious that it is needed that such a vote will be unanimous.

Section 5: Continuity of Defense

> **Section 5.** Until a new Commander in Chief is selected, every branch of the Armed Forces of the United States shall designate the highest-ranking officer who was not dismissed as its Acting Commander. These Acting Commanders, who report to the Acting Commander in Chief to be designated by the Interim Congress, shall have the responsibility to direct the forces under their command to maximize the safety and defense of the United States, its citizens, and its Armed Forces, and shall authorize offensive operations only to the extent necessary to maintain a defensive standing. Any munition or armament that would require the authorization of the President of the United States may instead be authorized by a recorded vote of three quarters of the Governors of the several States, until an Acting Commander in Chief is designated or a new President is elected. Any coalition of three quarters of the Governors of the several States may issue an order with the authority of the Acting Commander in Chief, until an Acting Commander in Chief is designated or a new President is elected.

The military is not a democracy. It also cannot be allowed to falter in its duties. This section defines who will lead each branch of the Armed Forces during the period immediately after No Confidence: that responsibility falls to the highest-ranking officer who was not dismissed. It also

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instructs those Acting Commanders to establish a defensive posture (which may, of course, require some amount of attacking, war being what it is.) Those officers report to the (currently empty) office of the Acting Commander in Chief.

The nuclear arsenal of the United States, along with anything else that requires civilian authorization, is placed under the collective control of the governors of the states, with a 75% threshold for approval. This vote is not public, being military in nature, but it is recorded. A group of 75% of the governors can also issue orders with the authority of the Acting Commander in Chief.

Section 6: Formation of an Interim Government

> **Section 6.** Once a government has been found in default of its oath of office, the States shall then elect an Interim Government to take its place. The Interim Government shall have the responsibility to address the flaws in the existing electoral system that resulted in a defaulted government, and thus it must not be elected using the same system: elected roles in the Interim Government may only be filled by Remedy Election, and appointed roles in the Interim Government may only be filled by members of the Interim Government. Each State may nominate up to one percent of its resident population as Civil Deputies in order to assist with the Remedy Election process.

The current state of our government is the product of 250 years of using the same electoral system, which has been adjusted and modified by the people it elects until we get to where we are today. Less than 5% of the House of Representatives changes with each election. Thus, if we want to see a change, we must use a brand-new electoral system to choose our Interim Government: the Remedy Election.

Civil Deputies are a new class of public servant introduced by the No Confidence Amendment, employed by the states but paid by the Federal Government. For more on Civil Deputies, see Section 16 and onward.

Section 7: Remedy Elections, generally

This section, along with Section 1, is a cornerstone of the No Confidence Amendment. Remedy Elections are a means to get a fair vote from the citizens of the United States even when the existing laws around elections and campaigning make it easy for organizations with money and power to unfairly bias them.

Because the integrity of Remedy Elections is so important, every clause in this section is written with its justification explicit in the text; this does not change the function of each clause, but it provides clarity for judges and justices that need to make rulings, either now or centuries down the line. (This does not mean that they will make *use* of such clarity; only that it will be there.)

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> **Section 7.** A Remedy Election is any electoral process legislated by a State or other entity that satisfies a number of specific objective criteria, all of which must be observed in order to certify the results as true and valid. To qualify as a valid Remedy Election, the full process must be enacted in law prior to beginning the process, and the following criteria must be observed, both in the laws describing the process and in the results of executing it:

Candidate pool

> (a) to ensure the same impartiality as a Trial Jury or Grand Jury, all candidates must first have been selected no more than ninety days prior to the election,

Remedy Election cycles are much shorter than the ones we're used to. This requirement of 90 days is an overstatement designed to allow for leeway; most Remedy Elections will take place in little over a month.

> either by observably random selection for the purpose, each from a population of at least ten thousand eligible citizens per role to be filled,

Each candidate on the ballot must have been chosen from a pool of 10,000 times the number of seats being elected (typically, the number of seats in the House of Representatives plus 2). The process of choosing officials randomly in order to obtain a representative, unbiased sample is known as sortition; here, we're using sortition to select the candidates people will be able to vote for.

For a state with only one seat in the House of Representatives, this means the Remedy Election for the Interim Congress must draw its candidates from a pool of thirty thousand. For California, with 52 seats in the House, they must draw from a pool of at least 540,000. These numbers account for around ten percent of each state's citizens of age 30 or over (those qualified to serve in the Senate); that fraction is significantly lower in the larger states.

This is intended to be large enough to force states to draw from the general population and not from some smaller organization, but small enough to allow them considerable leeway in what additional restrictions they place on candidates (in the same vein as trial lawyers can exclude potential jurors from the jury pool, and for similar reasons).

For example, a state with four seats in Congress (two in the Senate and two in the House) might decide to enact a law stating, "A Remedy Election ballot shall contain four names selected from among registered Democratic voters, four names selected from among registered Republican voters, and eight names selected from among all eligible citizens." This allows the state to ensure that a ballot will contain at *least* enough Democrats and Republicans that voters who only vote party-line will vote for enough candidates to fill all the seats in Congress.

> or by Remedy Election, and

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The clause “or by Remedy Election” allows for multi-stage Remedy Elections; more about those in Section 10.

> where every slot on the ballot has its selection method defined prior to any candidates being selected; and

The final clause ensures that the State does not change the rules mid-process; it also ensures that any candidate can drop out and be replaced with the same method, without breaking the rest of the ballot.

Ballot composition

> (b) to ensure the voters have a true measure of choice, the ballot of candidates must contain at least twice as many candidates as roles to be filled, and at least twelve candidates in total, and all candidates must be capable of serving in the role being elected for; and

One imagines that the states will likely want *more* than twice the number of roles on the ballot to avoid potentially alienating voters (our example above puts 16 candidates on a ballot to elect four seats), but twice the number of seats and twelve in total are reasonable minimums to ensure that there is a good spread of views.

We also don’t want anyone who is, for example, hospitalized and in a coma to show up on the ballot.

> (c) to avoid electing unwilling candidates, any selected citizen may recuse themself from the ballot, in which case any replacement, if required to uphold the other clauses, must also be selected by the same method; and

This is not a mandatory service like jury duty—we don’t want anyone who feels incapable of serving in Congress to be on the ballot. This clause ensures that states *do* have processes in place to fill an empty slot on the ballot if a candidate withdraws; that isn’t the kind of omission you want to discover while actually preparing for the election. Saying that candidates must be “selected by the same method” means that if a candidate chosen by selecting from among Republicans drops out, the state cannot replace that candidate with a Democrat.

> (d) to guarantee the ballot provides a true means for change, no candidate may have ever been elected to any role in the Federal Government; and

It’s vanishingly unlikely that any random selection *would* produce someone who was a former member of Congress—but if it did, that would cast doubt on the selection process itself, not to mention that the candidate would have an unfair advantage over everyone else on the ballot, so they may not be selected as a candidate in a Remedy Election.

> (e) to avoid the appearance of tampering, once a candidate is selected for the ballot, that candidate must appear on the ballot unless including that candidate

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> would violate any of the criteria set out in this Article, including but not limited to clause (c) of this section or clause (b) of Section 8, including any conditions for this Remedy Election specified per Section 10 of this Article; and

The states may not use “draw and discard” to artificially limit the pool size. For example, they may not choose from “a pool of all citizens” and then reject everyone who doesn’t happen to be a member of the state legislature. They may only discard a candidate if required to do so by this Amendment: for example, if a candidate is drawn by random selection but is not capable of serving in the Federal Government, clause (b) forces the state to discard that candidate.

Any restrictions the state enacts to limit what candidates appear on the ballot must shrink the selection pool itself, making it more difficult to satisfy the pool size requirement from clause (a). The state may specify “no felons” in their Remedy Election laws, as that can be used to restrict the candidate pool before selection; they may not specify “must pass the background check,” unless they’re willing to run a background check for every single person in the pool.

Election process

> (f) to ensure that all citizens are given full opportunity to express their opinions, each ballot must allow the voter to cast a vote for none, some, or all of the candidates; and

Remedy Elections use an approval voting system. While not as expressive as systems like ranked choice voting, it has a couple things going for it. First is familiarity; every state has the equipment and procedures in place to conduct a “pick zero or more” election, and every voter knows how to vote on such a ballot. Second is simplicity; there are multiple ways to do systems like ranked choice voting, and even if one were obviously better than the rest, simply the fact that there *is* an option means that it would be up for debate. Approval voting is the only way to do approval voting; there is nothing to debate.

> (g) to eliminate the risk of fraud affecting the results, each resident citizen who has reached eighteen years of age is required to submit a ballot, without exception or excuse, with a contestable penalty not to exceed $100 or eight hours of community service; and

We need the whole electorate voting in order for Remedy Elections to provide an accurate report. States must enact laws penalizing non-participation, as many voters will not consider such a requirement valid *without* a penalty for disobedience. Since there are, in fact, reasons a voter might not be able to vote regardless of intent (being in a coma for the entire election period, for example), those voters must have the chance to plead their case before the state. This clause does not require citizens to *vote;* voting is speech, and speech cannot be compelled, per the First Amendment. This clause only requires citizens to *submit a ballot,* which is not speech and thus does not conflict with the First Amendment.

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Note that this doesn't eliminate the risk of fraud; it eliminates the risk of fraud *affecting the results*. No observed or even theorized electoral fraud has the scale to swing these elections one way or another when the whole electorate (or close to it) is voting.

> (h) to ensure all voters are represented, a ballot count totalling at least ninety percent of that population must be observed, in which each ballot has at least as many votes as roles to be filled, to certify the results.

Any voter who has not placed at least as many votes as offices that are being elected is not being fully represented by the ballot. Approval voting works best, and is the most expressive about a populace's opinions, when there are *more* votes on each ballot than offices to be filled. Thus, by guaranteeing a minimum number of votes on each ballot, we're also guaranteeing the expressivity, and thus trustworthiness, of the results.

Note that, regardless of whether a voter has placed enough votes to qualify as part of the required 90%, their votes are still counted; as long as at least 90% of the other citizens in the state have submitted qualifying ballots, their votes will be totaled up with everyone else's.

Section 8: Election of Interim Congress

> **Section 8.** At the time a government is found in default, each of the several States shall void and decertify any maps drawn to divide their territory into Districts for the purposes of electing members of Congress.

The existing borders of the many Congressional election districts across the country are not by any means responsible for *all* the stagnation in our electoral system, but they certainly bear a large portion of the blame. That's not the reason No Confidence requires every state to throw out their electoral maps, though.

The reason this clause is here, as part of the No Confidence process, is because we expect that the electoral system *will* be changing in some way before the time we run regular elections again. If this clause were not part of No Confidence, then it would be the responsibility of the Interim Congress to order that, as part of writing new election laws—and that would set a very unfortunate precedent, and thus it would make the Interim Congress's job more difficult.

No Confidence is primarily an action *by* the States. Putting this clause here means that redrawing our electoral maps is something we are agreeing to voluntarily, rather than something imposed on us by Congress.

> The Governor of each State shall then call a Remedy Election to select new Senators and Representatives to form an Interim Congress with all possible haste.

It takes time to set up a Remedy Election. Some states, especially those who did not expect that the No Confidence Amendment would be ratified, may have to pass new election laws before they can hold one. There is no reasonable limit we can set on when the election must take place that would be fair to all the states. It is, however, to every state's benefit to do so as quickly as

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possible, so there's no need for one; we just specify that each governor must call one as soon as possible.

> The Remedy Election to elect members of an Interim Congress is additionally subject to the following criteria, which must be observed in addition to the above to certify the results:
>
> (a) the election shall be at-large, allowing all voters in the State the opportunity to vote for any or all candidates; and

If we're doing a Remedy Election, we can't trust any Congressional district lines, so the election is statewide. (Yes, the states should have voided those already. This just reiterates the point.)

> (b) if the ballot contains more than one candidate from any given County in the State, then the ballot must contain at least one candidate from each County in the State; and

County lines, meanwhile, don't change with any frequency, and so they can be trusted. (It is typically people that decide which county they live in, not the other way around.) However, the number of counties in a given state compared to the number of Congressional seats varies hugely. For states with more candidates on the ballot than counties, they must have at least one from each county, with additional candidates from any county; for most states, each candidate on the ballot must be from a different county.

> (c) if Senators and Representatives are elected in a mixed ballot, then all candidates must meet the qualifications to be a Senator,

States are not *required* to elect the Senators and Representatives as part of a single mixed ballot, though it is certainly the easiest method. Assuming they do, however, all of the candidates must be at least 30 years old, so that they can be a Senator; if some of the candidates in a mixed ballot were between 25 and 29 years old, it would effectively be reducing the number of Senatorial candidates.

If the state chooses not to use a mixed ballot, then they could have a Senatorial ballot with at least 12 candidates of citizens 30 and up, and a Representative ballot with candidates aged 25 and up.

> and any Senator elected must receive more votes than any Representative elected in the same Remedy Election, and the State may not fill any Representative roles unless and until all Senator roles are filled; and

For a mixed-ballot Remedy Election where both Senators and Representatives are selected from the same list, the state is required to send the two top candidates to the Senate; they may not choose which two to send after the votes are in.

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> (d) if a ballot count totalling at least ninety percent of the population of resident citizens of age is observed, but the ballots lack sufficient votes to certify the results for that number of roles to be filled, then the State must instead certify the results for the greatest number of roles that will satisfy clause (h) of section 6 of this Article, based on the ballots received.

This is the "partial credit" clause; it is both a benefit to the states with more Congressional seats like California and Texas, a safeguard against drawing a bad slate of candidates, and a defense against certain types of electoral manipulation. For example, in a state that leans heavily in one direction, the minority party might suggest to its voters that they undervote, thus disqualifying the election.

This clause ensures that doing so is self-defeating; undervoting by a certain number of votes will only reduce the number of seats that are elected (and force the state to call another Remedy Election to fill the rest of its seats, a big hassle to the citizens who participated in this undervoting scheme). Reducing the number of seats elected in a single Remedy Election favors only the majority party—and the majority party in any state is *already* incentivized to vote, since any undervoting by the majority party benefits minority parties much more than vice versa.

On the other hand, the random selection process, being random, could simply produce candidates that are unappealing to the voters. If our hypothetical four-seat state above had four Republican candidates and twelve Democratic candidates on the ballot, but two of the Republicans (and all of the Democrats) were unacceptable to the Republican voters, then that state would send only two members to Congress, and it would have to hold another Remedy Election for the other two seats.

The larger states, meanwhile, might simply have trouble getting their voters to cast that many votes; this allows them to still have representation in Congress at the conclusion of their first Remedy Election, and none of the criteria forbid re-using candidates from one ballot in the next ballot, so long as none of the state's Remedy Election laws have changed in the meantime. The state can simply continue holding Remedy Elections until all of its seats in Congress are filled.

Section 9: Composition and Term of the Interim Congress

> **Section 9.** Upon certification of the results, each Interim Senator and Representative shall assume their office as soon as possible,

Unlike with our current electoral system, a Remedy Election is done when we *don't* currently have a government in place, and so (much like when a Special Election is called to fill an empty seat) the election winners take their seats as soon as the ballot is certified.

> but in no event prior to thirty days following the date the former Government is found in default.

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There will be a guaranteed gap of one month between No Confidence and the beginning of the Interim Congress, however. This provides a target for states to shoot for: as long as they complete their Remedy Election process within one month, they will be guaranteed to participate starting from the very beginning of the Interim Congress.

No, this doesn't provide much time for campaigning. That's the point. One month is enough time to:

- Contact a couple dozen (perhaps up to a hundred-plus) randomly-chosen citizens from across the counties aged 30 and up and ask if they want to appear on the Remedy Election ballot (1 week);
- Bring them all to the state capitol and enroll them in a legislative training crash course that will last up through and probably even after the election (1 week);
- Have each candidate record a video talking about who they are, what their experience is, and what their views are, and broadcast those videos to the public over TV and online (1 week); and
- Schedule an election on a day of the week that is convenient for the majority of residents in the state (1 week).

That's not to say that's what they *have* to do, of course, but it's a reasonable timetable, if the state has enough manpower.

However, that's a big "if", and that would disadvantage states with tighter budgets in the Remedy Elections and the Interim Congress itself. To prevent that from happening, Remedy Elections are indirectly funded by the Federal Government itself. (This seems reasonable. After all, if the Federal Government were doing its job properly, the states would never have invoked No Confidence.) More about funding and manpower in Section 16 and onward.

> Each Representative in the Interim Congress shall serve for the Term of the Interim Congress, which shall last from the first date half of the several States have seated a Member in the Interim Congress, until the next Congress is elected and begins its session; provided, however, that no election for a new Congress or President shall take place unless one year has passed since the beginning of the Term.

The Interim Congress session does not begin on the standard 2-year cycle; it begins when at least 25 states have completed their Remedy Elections and seated at least one Representative or Senator, no less than 30 days after No Confidence. It does, however, *end* on the standard cycle, so the session will not last exactly two years. The term length will be from 1 to 3 years, as the next general or midterm election will be skipped if it is within the next year.

> Each Senator shall serve a Term that ends no earlier than the Term of the Interim Congress, until the next candidate for their seat is duly elected and sworn in.

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The Interim Senators assume their state's seats in the Senate, and so each one already belongs to one of the three election year classes; these classes do not change. Thus, each Interim Senator will serve from 1 to 3 years, from 3 to 5 years, or from 5 to 7 years.

> For purposes of determining a Quorum, the House of Representatives shall only consider the seats that have been filled by Remedy Election for this Interim Congress, provided that half of the several States have filled at least one seat in the House of Representatives for this Interim Congress.

If one or more high-population States repeatedly fail to perform a Remedy Election, it could quickly make it impossible to gather the 218 Representatives required to form a quorum. This clause adjusts the quorum rules once at least half the states have completed their Remedy Elections so that the size of the House only considers the seats that have already been filled once in this Interim Congress. Only half of *those* will be required for a quorum. Without the above clause, it could require up to 41 states to fill a quorum in the House of Representatives!

There is no such similar clause for the Senate; there must be 50 Senators to constitute a quorum, and that means that at least 25 states must succeed in their Remedy Elections in order for the Senate to be able to have a quorum and start business. The best reason not to add a similar clause for the Senate is that a Congress made up of representatives from less than half the states would lack legitimacy (which is why the quorum rule only activates after passing that threshold); it would not truly be the will of the United States in that case. However, there is an equally good reason not to include it: it might destroy the entire No Confidence Amendment.

The one and only thing that an Amendment *cannot* do in 2026 is listed in Article V of the Constitution: "no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate." There is an argument to be made that if a state fails its Remedy Election, that is a form of consent, but it is an *argument that would have to be made.* The only party that could decide that argument is the Supreme Court, and if the nation seeks to invoke No Confidence, we must assume that it cannot be trusted with that decision—not to mention that it would be quite the conflict of interest! There can be no question of the constitutionality of the No Confidence Amendment, and thus it must not change the quorum rules of the Senate.

> Until an Interim Vice President has been elected per section 10 of this article, the Interim Senator who received the highest percentage of votes shall serve as the President of the Senate.

Normally, the Vice President casts tie-breaking votes in the Senate, but there won't be a Vice President yet. This gives the Senator with the best mandate from the people of their home state that power.

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Section 10: Election of Interim President and Vice President

The Interim Government must, obviously, have a President and Vice President; they are elected after the Interim Congress, because by that point we will have a trustworthy entity to make decisions on our behalf.

> **Section 10.** The Interim Congress shall determine the conditions for a Remedy Election that will elect an Interim President and Vice President of the United States.

The Interim Congress doesn't really need the instruction to determine the conditions of the Presidential election right away, since there isn't that much that a Congress can do without a President to sign bills into law. This clause isn't here to *force* the Interim Congress to act; it is to give them the *power* to act. Since this act is specified in the text of the amendment as a power belonging to Congress and to Congress alone, they are not required to seek approval from any other body—which is good, because at that point in time there won't be any other body for them to seek approval *from.*

> No member of the Interim Congress may execute the powers and duties of the office of President of the United States before this election is held and the Interim President has been seated, with the exception of an Acting Commander in Chief that the Interim Senate shall choose from among the members of the Interim Congress by majority vote.

United States law provides for the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives to serve as the Acting President, when both the President and Vice President are unable. This clause is a restriction on the Interim Congress; they may not use this method (or any other) to circumvent the need to have a properly-elected President in the White House, though once the Interim President *is* elected and sworn in, the Presidential line of succession reverts to its typical behavior.

Every member of the Interim Congress has a similar mandate from the people of the United States: they have been chosen fairly by the people of their home state. Members of the Interim Senate have, on average, a better mandate than members of the Interim House, because of clause (c) of section 8. Thus, until the citizens of America can choose their new President and thus Commander in Chief themselves, the Interim Senate does so on their behalf.

> This Remedy Election must be held as soon as practicable, and in no event later than five months from the date the first member of the Interim Congress is seated, and is additionally subject to the following criteria, unless otherwise specified by the Interim Congress:

The Interim Congress is granted 5 months to set up the Remedy Election for Interim President. This acts as both a time limit for deliberation and a safeguard for the country; if the Interim Congress is *unable* to determine these conditions, whether from being unable to come to a

consensus, being unable to form a quorum, or any other reason, then the country will elect an Interim President anyway, who will then have the executive power to assist in whatever has stymied Congress. The United States will not spend longer than 6 months in total without a President before being able to vote for our new leader.

Note that, while the Interim Congress has the authority to set conditions on the Remedy Election for Interim President and Vice President, they may not alter the definition of a Remedy Election *itself,* as specified in Section 3. They may choose not to use the conditions specified below, replacing them with any other method of conducting a nationwide Remedy Election, but the following rules provide a reasonable baseline.

> (a) the ballot shall have no more than one pair of candidates from each State and one pair from the District constituting the seat of government of the United States; and
>
> (b) each pair of candidates shall have been selected by an at-large Remedy Election held in their State or District; and

The Interim President of the United States might turn out to be the single most politically influential role in the history of 21st century America. No other President will be responsible for signing into law the bills that the Interim Congress writes to reshape our government for the next however many hundreds of years our government lasts until we need to call once again upon No Confidence, so we need to ensure that this election, even more so than those for the Interim Congress, elects the best, most honest, and most truly *American* candidate to lead us through these difficult years.

This is what that extra clause from the first of the Remedy Election criteria in Section 7 is about: "…all candidates must first have been selected no more than ninety days prior to the election, either by observably random selection … **or by Remedy Election**." The default rules for the Remedy Election for Interim President make it a two-stage process, just like our existing primary/general elections. However, rather than one nationwide election for each *party* followed by a nationwide election from among the winners, this format is one at-large election for each *state* followed by a nationwide election from among the winners.

These rules do not *require* each State to submit a pair of candidates for the ballot; this, combined with the requirement to hold the nationwide election within five months of the Interim Congress being seated, means that each state must act to ensure it holds a successful Remedy Election in time, or the nationwide election will go forward without that state's candidates on the ballot. The 90-day limit on when these candidates may have been selected becomes the timer on the presidential campaigns. Once the statewide Remedy Elections have been held, the winning pair of each statewide race then has three months to campaign nationally prior to the nationwide Presidential election.

Thus, the public should expect three Remedy Elections, after a No Confidence. The first will take place about one month after No Confidence, electing the Interim Congress. (Larger states might require a couple extra, to elect their whole Congressional delegation.) The second will

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happen about three months after No Confidence, the statewide “primary” election for the Interim President/Vice President candidates. The third will take place three months later—six months after No Confidence—for the Interim President and Vice President.

> (c) a State or District participates in the Remedy Election for Interim President and Vice President by conducting and certifying a Remedy Election among its citizens, using the same criteria and list of candidates as every other participating State or District, and publishing the results; and
>
> (d) the Remedy Election shall be certified by the Library of Congress once enough certified Remedy Election results have been published to determine that all criteria have been met.

The last two clauses provide direction for how exactly to run a distributed Remedy Election, in the case that the Interim Congress is unable to or decides not to come up with other criteria. Each state runs their own Remedy Election and publishes the results; the Library of Congress is responsible for receiving those results and adding them up.

Section 11: Term of Interim President and Vice President

> **Section 11.** The Interim President and Vice President shall assume their offices as soon as the Remedy Election results are certified,

As with the Interim Congress, we want the elected candidates to take their offices as soon as possible. Once the nationwide Remedy Election is held and the results are certified, there is no delay before the winners are sworn in.

> and in no event later than six months after the Interim Congress begins its session.

This clause is not necessary for the basic functioning of the electoral process or for the implementation by the governments; this acts as a shield for the courts. If there are disputes about the results of any of the elections, this provides a time limit for how long any legal protests are permitted to take. Presuming the timeline is as above, this gives a one-month period for disputes and recounts.

> They shall serve a term that ends no earlier than that of the Interim Congress, until the next President and Vice President are duly elected and sworn in.

If the Interim Congress is seated with more than one year left in the current Presidential term, then the Interim President and VP simply serve the remainder of that term, to a minimum of 6 months. If less than one year remains, the scheduled general election for the next President and Congress are skipped (as detailed in Section 5), and the Interim President serves between 4 and 5 years.

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Section 12: Authority of the Interim Government

> **Section 12.** The Interim Government of the United States is the Federal Government of the United States, with all the powers and responsibilities afforded to it by this Constitution.

The Interim Government is a special body elected once, for a particular purpose; it would be easy for opponents to claim that this limits them in some way, that they don't have the authority to make whatever changes are necessary to heal the corruption in our legal and electoral system, or to repair our relationship with the rest of the world.

The reason that Remedy Elections are such an onerous burden on the citizens of the United States is so that we *can* be certain that these are the right people for the job. Once we've made our choice, any attempt to discredit them would discredit the whole of the United States.

> The Interim Government is additionally responsible for choosing the disposition of actions that have been suspended by the text of this Article. The Interim Congress may, through a simple majority vote in both Houses, lift the suspension from any action or actions. A suspended action or actions may instead be annulled and voided through a simple majority vote in both Houses and approval from the Interim President, or by a two-thirds supermajority of both Houses.

The Interim Government is responsible for deciding on the disposition of the suspended actions of the previous government, described in Section 3. It is intentionally easier to approve an action than to annul it; approving actions of the prior government only takes a majority vote from the Interim Congress, while annulling them additionally requires the Interim President's signature or a two-thirds supermajority, like a law.

> The Interim Congress may delegate the authority to lift the suspension of an action or actions to the department or agency who performed that action or actions in the first place. The authority to annul or void a suspended action may not be delegated.

Many, if not most, of the suspended actions will have been performed by Federal agencies, rather than by Congress, the President, or the Supreme Court, and they may number in the thousands. Rather than having to review each of these regulatory actions individually at the Congress level, the Interim Congress can simply ask the originating agency to review them.

> Any action that remains suspended at the conclusion of the Term of the Interim Congress shall be annulled and voided.

The default disposition for suspended actions must be to annul them, however. If a given action of the prior government cannot even obtain a simple majority in the Interim Congress (or the equivalent in its originating agency), given the entire length of the term, it must not be allowed to stand.

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> Any person elected to an office pursuant to the text of this Article is a member of the Interim Government, as is any person appointed to or selected for such an office by a member of the Interim Government, unless that person is reconfirmed following the conclusion of the Interim Government.

Much like the clause in Section 1 which defines the roles to be removed, this clause defines what roles are “Interim Government roles” by self-reference. Anyone elected to the government by Remedy Election after a No Confidence is a member of the Interim Government; so is anyone they appoint, in addition to any subordinates those appointees choose. The last clause allows interim appointees to be made permanent by the next government after.

Section 13: Limits on re-election

> **Section 13.** The Interim Government has the additional responsibility to address the flaws present in the electoral process, and so its motives must be beyond question. No member of the Interim Government may be elected as a Senator, Representative, President, or Vice President until ten years following the conclusion of their service.

One of the reasons our electoral process has become so flawed is because the people making the rules for the process are also the people elected by that process. We must ensure that the Interim Congress and President do not fall prey to the same trap; thus, any person chosen by the Remedy Election process or appointed by the Interim Government may not be chosen by the *standard* election process until 10 years after they leave office.

Section 14: Isolation of electoral processes

> **Section 14.** After a government has been found in default, no State may conduct an election for a role in the Federal Government, nor may such an elected candidate take office, unless it fulfills all the criteria of a Remedy Election, or unless one year shall have passed since the date the Interim Congress began its session, unless otherwise specified by the Interim Congress.

While the prior sections establish the *primary* mechanisms for electing citizens to the Interim Government, it is important to ensure that its integrity is not compromised by the introduction of officials who were *not* chosen by Remedy Election. This section ensures that, for example, special elections to fill an empty seat after a resignation are conducted under the same rules.

This section prohibits states from using anything other than a Remedy Election when electing *any* role in the Federal Government, starting at the time that No Confidence is executed and ending one year after the Interim Congress is seated, the minimum duration of an Interim Congress session. As Congress already has the authority to regulate electoral policy, they may extend this prohibition to the full duration of the Interim Congress session, but only as an Act of Congress, properly signed by the Interim President.

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The wording of this section also guards against some potentially strange timings, like for example if No Confidence is ratified after an election, but before the elected candidates take office. Once No Confidence is executed, no one elected by the traditional system may take office, even if the election already happened.

Section 15: Interim Supreme Court Justices

> **Section 15.** An Interim Justice of the Supreme Court is any Justice appointed to the Supreme Court by an Interim President. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 12 of this Article and Section 1 of Article III of this Constitution, Interim Justices shall hold their Offices only until the conclusion of the next Presidential Term following the Interim Presidency. This section shall not apply to any such Justice who is reconfirmed by the President and the Senate during that Term.

When the people elect the Interim Government after No Confidence is ratified, they will be using an untested electoral process to choose people who will be making decisions for the country for the next one to seven years. Section 12 guarantees the Interim Government all the powers of the United States Government, including appointing Justices to the Supreme Court.

We cannot take that power away, either; the country may (and in fact probably will) need a Supreme Court prior to the conclusion of the Interim Government. However, Supreme Court Justices hold their offices for life, and thus will be around to affect the country for much longer than the Interim Government that appointed them. Any other act by the Interim Government can be repealed or reversed by a subsequent normally-elected government, but it's very important that the President and Congress *cannot* remove a sitting Justice; that's an important part of our country's checks and balances, and we're trying to *add* to those, not weaken them.

Nonetheless, an Interim Government that can appoint Supreme Court Justices for life could reasonably make people apprehensive, and that might translate into reluctance to support No Confidence or to participate in the Remedy Elections thereafter, two outcomes that both must be avoided at all costs.

So, instead, a compromise: once the Interim Government has provided us with new, less corruptible election laws and we use them to elect a new President, that President must reconfirm each Justice who was appointed by the Interim President, with the cooperation of that Senate. If any Justice is *not* reconfirmed, their term ends with that Presidential term.

This provides a way to ensure that the Interim Government's impact remains limited to around the time they are in power, without creating a precedent whereby a sitting President and/or Congress can remove a Justice during a given Presidential term. The most that a sitting President may do, even in this case, is to refuse to confirm one or more of the Justices; they will still remain on the Supreme Court during that President's term, and if the public disapproves of the President's or Senate's behavior in this matter, they will have a chance to make their disapproval known at the polls before the empty seats can be filled.

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Section 16: Civil Deputies, nomination

No Confidence is going to be expensive. Not only does the country need to hold three Remedy Elections, the abrupt transition of power will inevitably cause a period of economic instability in the markets. To ensure this instability does not fall on the shoulders of everyday working Americans, this Amendment also provides an infusion of money into each state's economy, millions of jobs, and a new pathway to government employment, in the form of a new type of civil service: Civil Deputies.

> **Section 16.** The process heretofore described in this Article must be followed by each State, without affecting or being affected by budgetary concerns. When a government is found in default per the text of this Article, each State may nominate, with the consent of each citizen so nominated, a number of its citizens not to exceed one percent of its total population, as of the most recent Census taken in that State. These citizens shall serve the State as Civil Deputies for a fixed term of two calendar years from the date of their nomination. Any such nominations must be reported to the Treasury of the United States within 90 days after the government is found in default.

Civil Deputies are state employees who serve a fixed term (in this case, 2 years), whose wages are paid by the Federal Government. Each state may pick up to 1% of its population as Civil Deputies. States can hire on the manpower they need by putting out a public call for citizens to apply for Civil Deputy service; they can free up their budget by nominating existing state employees. Ratifying No Confidence will **create around 3 million jobs nationwide**.

In comparison: the federal government employs around 2M citizens (0.6% of the population), and AI has claimed the jobs of about 500,000 others (0.1%) since the beginning of 2025. In the other direction, 16.4M soldiers fought in World War 2; that accounted for approximately 12% of the population at the time.

Worth noting: while only US Citizens may be nominated as Civil Deputies, the size of a state's Civil Deputy allowance scales with *total* population, not citizen population.

Section 17: Civil Deputies, wages

> **Section 17.** The Federal Government shall provide each Civil Deputy with a living wage commensurate with their location and family status. Once per year, each State shall provide the Treasury of the United States with a schedule of wages. Each wage shall vary only by (a) County or equivalent metropolitan area of residence, (b) number, up to 1, of cohabiting adults, and (c) number, up to 3, of dependent children. Each wage shall be sufficient to support the Civil Deputy and the specified number of adults and children. The State must provide justification for each wage to the Internal Revenue Service upon request.

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Every Civil Deputy gets paid a living wage to support them and their family—where “family”, in this case, means the Civil Deputy, another adult living with them (spouse, partner, roommate), and up to three children. This data already exists.

Based on current numbers, if 1% of the existing US population were to be nominated as Civil Deputies, it would add up to around **$300 billion per year**. That’s money that goes directly into the pockets of American citizens; not as charity or a stimulus, but as payment for providing an invaluable service to our country. That money stays largely in the state’s economy, invigorating local businesses and providing extra tax income to states and localities.

Section 18: Civil Deputies, duties and state regulations

> **Section 18.** Each Civil Deputy is considered an employee of the nominating State and is not permitted to refuse any reasonable request or assignment provided by their State. Each State shall have the power to enforce regulations governing the presentation, behavior, and outside employment of any Civil Deputies they nominate by appropriate legislation, provided that such a regulation only affects Civil Deputies nominated after its introduction.

Civil Deputies are state employees who go where their state needs them to go, and who aren’t permitted to stop being Civil Deputies. (They can refuse unreasonable requests or assignments, however; the question of what constitutes “unreasonable” will be up to the states and the courts to decide.)

One reason they can’t leave the Civil Deputy service itself is because one of the primary goals of the service is to provide a stable, predictable surge workforce for the state and the country. If Civil Deputies were allowed to leave voluntarily, a particularly ill-considered law passed by a state government could cause a large number of their Civil Deputies to quit in protest. Since states are not entitled to nominate new Civil Deputies unless authorized by Congress, that would result in a major loss of Federal funds to the state, which might cause an unrecoverable economic disaster.

This is not solely for the state’s benefit, however. Since a Civil Deputy cannot voluntarily quit, that also means a Civil Deputy cannot be *coerced* to quit; otherwise, the Federal Government would be incentivized to encourage Civil Deputies to leave the service.

Since Civil Deputies are not permitted to leave the service before their tour of duty is complete, the state must enact any regulations *before* a citizen signs up, or the regulation won’t apply to them, unless that Civil Deputy chooses to opt in to the new regulations.

(Note that a Civil Deputy may still leave an *assignment,* for example to escape a bad supervisor, but they will then be available to be reassigned by the state; see the following section.)

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Section 19: Civil Deputies, rights

> **Section 19.** A Civil Deputy may choose to leave an assignment under the same conditions as a citizen of their State may choose to leave an employer, and shall report any such departure to their State; this will affect neither the end date of their service nor the wages they are entitled to per Section 17 of this Article.

Civil Deputies are not permitted to leave the *service* before the end of their term, but they can leave an assignment the same as they can quit a job. (The state wouldn't be able to assign them back to that job, either; telling someone to work for an abusive boss is obviously an unreasonable request, or at least it should be.)

> A Civil Deputy may request a leave of absence from their State, which must grant any reasonable request for leave insofar as such a grant does not constitute a danger to the United States or its citizens.

They can request time off, as well; the state is required to grant "reasonable" requests for leave so long as they do not constitute a "danger." Much like the question of what is a "reasonable" request the state can make of a Civil Deputy, these are definitions that the legislators and courts will have to work out over time.

> A Civil Deputy may choose to adopt new regulations introduced during their term of service. Their State shall record the date of adoption, and thenceforth that Civil Deputy shall be affected by any and all regulations introduced on or before that adoption date.

Not all regulations are bad for employees. For example, a state might introduce a regulation stating that Civil Deputies cannot be required to work more than five days a week. Civil Deputies may choose to opt into the new regulations, but only on the whole; they may not pick and choose which new regulations affect them.

> A Civil Deputy whose term of service ends within ninety days may request, of Congress or its appointed representative, an extension of that term.

The only parties who get a say in whether a Civil Deputy gets to extend their term of service are that Civil Deputy and the Federal government. To the State, there is no downside (other than record-keeping) to having a Civil Deputy; they are presumed to be in favor.

Much like the restrictions against quitting the service, this is a disguised benefit to the Civil Deputies themselves; since it must be the *Civil Deputy* who asks, and not their state, it means the state can't just submit a list of people to Congress and say, "Extend all these terms, please," perhaps with a bunch of signatures that Civil Deputies may have been pressured into providing. Similarly, limiting extensions to the last three months of service ensures that a Civil Deputy can't discover that their service has been extended out to decades because someone made a photocopy of their "term extension" form and just kept submitting it to Congress.

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Section 20: Civil Deputies, federalizing

> **Section 20.** Upon request, each State must provide Congress with a list of its Civil Deputies, including for each their name, home address, date of nomination, date of regulation adoption, end date of Civil Deputy service, end date of leave (if on leave), current assignment (if any), address of current assignment (if any), and whether that assignment is essential for State function. Congress may request the State assign tasks to its unassigned and non-essential Civil Deputies; if a Civil Deputy is unassigned, the State must comply. Civil Deputies assigned to tasks provided by Congress are considered Federal employees for the duration of that assignment. States may request the release of any Civil Deputy currently assigned to Federal tasks; Congress must comply within 30 days.

There will always be Civil Deputies who aren't currently assigned to a task. Perhaps a bridge repair completes and the crew is no longer needed; perhaps a Civil Deputy completes an assignment faster than expected. These "unemployed" Civil Deputies are still paid, because they aren't unemployed at all: they provide a reserve workforce that the state government can call upon any time it needs extra hands.

The Federal Government, as well, has tasks that could make use of this massive distributed labor force. Congress is permitted to ask states to assign Federal tasks to any Civil Deputies who aren't performing essential state functions. If the Civil Deputy is completely unassigned ("unemployed") then the state is not permitted to refuse. (The Civil Deputy, of course, is still permitted to refuse unreasonable requests.)

While working on a Federal assignment, a Civil Deputy is considered a Federal employee. Their state may recall them from Federal service for any reason, and the Federal Government must release them from their assignment within 30 days.

Section 21: Civil Deputies, federal regulation

> **Section 21.** The Congress shall have the power to enforce regulations governing the presentation, behavior, and outside employment of Civil Deputies nominated by any State by appropriate legislation, provided such a regulation only affects Civil Deputies nominated after its introduction, or which only affects Civil Deputies assigned to Federal service.

To promote unity across the various state Civil Deputy services, and to enforce regulations on Civil Deputies assigned to Federal Service, Congress is allowed to pass laws regulating Civil Deputies who are currently assigned to the Federal Government. These can take effect immediately, since all Civil Deputies assigned to the Federal Government are allowed to quit that assignment per Section 19.

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It's also permitted to pass laws regulating all Civil Deputies in the nation, but since those can't be passed until we have a full Interim Government, they won't immediately affect anyone nominated for the Remedy Elections; they will only affect Civil Deputies who sign on afterwards (if Congress authorizes such), or who choose to adopt the new regulations.

Section 22: Civil Deputies, powers of Congress

> **Section 22.** The Congress shall have the power to authorize States to nominate additional Civil Deputies, and to enforce Sections 16 through 22 of this Article, by appropriate legislation.

Of course, in order for any more Civil Deputies to sign on afterwards, the states will have to be authorized to nominate them. This last section gives Congress that power.

It also gives Congress the standard "you may pass laws to enforce this Amendment" power, but only for the sections relating to Civil Deputies; Congress is explicitly *not* given any powers around the No Confidence or Remedy Election process itself, other than what the text explicitly specifies. If we are to change, alter, or enhance how the No Confidence process works, then we must do it the same way we implement it in the first place: by Constitutional Amendment.

> This shall include the power to demand remuneration from the States for any excess wages paid up to one calendar year prior to the introduction of such legislation pursuant to Section 17 of this Article, insofar as such excess resulted from any misrepresentations made by that State.

The final balance check for the No Confidence Amendment: since No Confidence removes Congress at the same time as introducing Civil Deputies, there is no Federal entity capable of regulating the behavior of the States at the time of the Remedy Elections. States are expected to send the Treasury an accurate and non-inflated schedule of wages for all their Civil Deputies, for example.

This clause allows Congress not only to regulate what is considered "fair pay," it gives the Interim Congress the power to recover any funds misappropriated by any states during the period before the Interim Government was up and running.

Since this is a fairly dangerous power—it means that the states themselves are, effectively, bound by regulations that have not been written yet, the exact thing we avoid with the Civil Deputies themselves—it comes with a strict limitation: Congress can only claw funds back from a state if those funds were the result of that state lying in some way. This could be by inflating the wage numbers without reason, or by making up citizens who don't exist, or even, potentially, by lying to citizens to get them to sign up for Civil Deputy service.

As long as states play fair, though, they aren't at risk of having to pay the Federal Government back later on.

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Frequently Asked Questions

- **Q:** How does a mixed-ballot Remedy Election work?

  A: It is, in effect, two Remedy Elections at the same time, with both ballots printed on the same piece of paper. Each of the two ballots (Senatorial and Representative) are considered independently for purposes of “how many votes are needed.” If the 90th percentile of Senatorial ballots only has one vote, extra votes on the Representative ballots will not allow the state to send a second Senator to Congress.

Open Questions

As stated in the introduction, this draft is still far from complete. Many questions still need answering before this can be considered as legislation; some of these are listed below.

- Section 1: exactly how many people will No Confidence remove from their positions? The recursive definition may need to be restricted, if it hits too many critical roles.
- Does Section 1 as currently written protect Congressional staffers? They need to get dismissed by No Confidence in order to receive the Section 2 protections, including keeping their paychecks.
- Civil Deputies follow in the footsteps of one extremely successful American program (the WPA, just prior to WW2) and one failed one (CETA, shortly thereafter). One of the biggest issues with CETA was corruption; state governments would simply name political allies as recipients, rather than creating jobs. The fairly onerous restrictions on Civil Deputies attempt to guard against that type of corruption, but may need tweaking.
- Should there be an explicit carve-out for counties, cities, towns, and other sub-state localities to nominate their own Civil Deputies, or should this be left to the states to decide?
- Does the economic incentive as written in fact compensate for the burden states will be taking on with Remedy Elections? This will need input from state legislators and others familiar with state budgetary needs.

Version History

- **July 3, 2026:** initial public draft
- **August 11, 2026:**
  - Added introductory section; textual changes
  - “Restricted Elections” renamed to “Remedy Elections”
  - Section 1 etc: “in breach” replaced with “in default”
  - Section 1: removed clause allowing dismissed officials to resume their roles

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    - Section 1: actions taken by the outgoing government are no longer immediately canceled, they are “suspended”
    - Added Section 3 (was 2), defining what it means when an action is suspended
    - Section 5 (was 2): added Civil Deputy authorization
    - Section 6 (was 3):
        - specifies Remedy Elections must be fully legislated, and that the criteria apply to both the legislation and the result
        - candidate selection rules must be decided per slot on the ballot before any selection begins
        - candidates must never have been elected to the Federal Government
        - candidates cannot be discarded except under specific circumstances
        - penalties for non-voting in a Remedy Election specified
    - Section 8 (was 5): Interim Senator with highest percentage of votes serves as President of the Senate until we have a VP
    - Section 9 (was 6): Acting Commander in Chief is now selected by majority vote of the Interim Senate, selected from among the Interim Congress
    - Section 12 (was 8): added disposition rules for suspended actions
    - Added Sections 16-22 (were 13-18), defining Civil Deputies
- **August 12, 2026:** minor textual changes
- **August 16, 2026:**
    - Added Section 2, protecting dismissed politicians
    - Added Section 4, defining continuity rules for government
    - Added Section 5, defining continuity rules for military
    - Added Section 10 clauses (c) and (d), providing logistic direction for the multi-state Remedy Election for Pres/VP if the Interim Congress doesn’t
    - Section 12: added delegation of suspended action review to the originating agency
- **August 17, 2026:**
    - Section 4: only applies to Federal organizations, not state or private
    - Section 7 clause (e): the conditions set by the Interim Congress for the Interim Presidential Remedy Election also qualify as valid reasons to discard a candidate after selection
    - Section 9:
        - the Term of the Interim Congress doesn’t start until at least 25 states are participating
        - quorum-adjustment for Interim House of Representatives only takes effect once 25 states are participating
        - clarify that Interim Senators don’t get longer terms if they were elected late (“ends no earlier than”, not “is no shorter than”)
    - Section 10: removed clause forcing the Interim Congress to decide the Interim President election “as its first act”; there are good reasons it might want to wait a week or two to address that, like to allow more states to complete their Remedy Elections, and we don’t want to limit what else they can do (like selecting an Acting Commander in Chief if necessary) beforehand

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- **August 18, 2026:**
  - Added Section 19, elaborating the rights of Civil Deputies:
    - May choose to leave an assignment
    - May request leave
    - May adopt current regulations
    - May request extension of service
  - Section 20 (was 19): added regulation adoption date, service end date, and leave end date to reported data for Civil Deputies
  - Section 22 (was 21):
    - Added general enforcement powers over the Civil Deputies sections of the Amendment
    - Added Federal clawback of excess wages, if the state lied to get them
- **August 20, 2026:**
  - Added FAQ and Open Questions sections
  - Section 1: Federal actions get suspended even if the person who performed them resigns their post the day before No Confidence gets ratified.
  - Section 5: Acting Commanders explicitly report to Acting CinC; 75% of governors, their powers combined, can issue orders as the Acting CinC

This document was last modified on August 20, 2026.

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